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Abstract 
 
In the matter between Sumiseki Materials Co Ltd v Wambo Coal 
Pty Ltd 2013 NSWSC 235 (25 Mar 2013) the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales had to decide on the legal difficulty arising 
from unpaid dividends. The Court was required to decide 
whether a shareholder has a right to a predetermined annual 
dividend. The principles applied by the Supreme Court entailed 
estoppel (common law), minority oppression (company law) and 
contractual law principles. Although the principles of estoppel 
were relevant, these fall outside the ambit of this article 
concerning unpaid dividends. The Supreme Court cited 
approximately 40 cases and considered 5000 pages of 
documentary evidence pertaining to the contractual right to a 
predetermined dividend. Although the latter seems applicable 
and relevant to the South African corporate law environment, 
South African case law does not support it. Besides a contractual 
right, this article also investigates the Oxford Legal Group case 
in establishing at least an implied right (based on the doctrine of 
proper purpose) to claim an undeclared dividend or 
unauthorised dividend that is contrary to the board of directors 
discretion not to authorise any dividends. Both these cases 
argue when and why a court should interfere in company 
resolutions in striking a better balance between a right to a 
dividend and a company's discretionary power not to 
recommend or declare a dividend.  
Keywords 
Dividend, distribution, damages, proper purpose, implied right, 
declare a dividend, shares, profits for dividends. 
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1 Introduction and background 
Claims for damages in the event of the non-payment of dividends present 
an interesting economic reality that must be viewed from the company as 
well as the shareholder's perspective.1 To shareholders, the payment of a 
dividend is important, as it indicates growth in their investment portfolios in 
terms of the return on investment (ROI) ratio. For a company, non-payment 
contributes favourably to its ability to grow financially or settle its debts in 
the course of business. But which of these two sides should receive 
preferential treatment in company law?  
It is frequently argued that the courts are reluctant to interfere in the 
discretionary power of the board, or to assist the general meeting of 
shareholders, as shareholders always have the option of selling their non-
performing shares to fellow shareholders or the public. In terms of the law, 
however, this statement must be qualified on two grounds, namely that the 
constitution of a company represents a contract, and that the avoidance of 
paying dividends can imply a claim for damages.2 Although the latter seems 
applicable and relevant to the South African corporate law environment, 
South African case law does not support it. Therefore this contribution 
consults relevant Australian and English case law, and identifies valuable 
principles laid down in those jurisdictions on the disputability of a company 
board's discretionary powers as well as the importance of a company 
constitution in establishing a right, or at least implying a right, to claim an 
undeclared or unauthorised dividend and/or a declared or authorised 
dividend that is not paid.3 It is hoped that the judicial precedent in the United 
Kingdom and Australia may guide South African courts to possibly put 
forward a more balanced legal approach than the current one of simply not 
granting any damages at all.  
                                            
*  Cornelius G Kilian. LLM (UP); MA (Regensburg); LLD (UFS). Former interim 
researcher at the European Academy, research fellow at the University of the Free 
State, South Africa and research fellow at Deakin University, Australia. Email: 
corneliuskilian@hotmail.com. 
**  Elizabeth Snyman-Van Deventer. LLM (UFS); LLM (UFS); LLD (UFS). Professor of 
Law, Head of the Department of Mercantile Law, University of the Free State, South 
Africa. Email: snymane@ufs.ac.za. 
1  In this regard see Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 537; Visser 
et al South African Mercantile and Company Law 245-266; Cilliers et al Corporate 
Law 85-86. 
2  See Kilian 2007 THRHR 391. 
3  See in general Tyler 1987 HKLJ 230-236; Cassim Practitioner's Guide 116. The 
1973 Companies Act in table A referred to declaring and recommending a dividend. 
The 2008 Act, however, refers only to authorised distributions and does not require 
shareholders' approval, unless prescribed in the memorandum of incorporation.  
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If a dividend is declared but the company fails to effect payment, one may 
argue the existence of a personal right. On the other hand, in the event of 
an undeclared dividend it is problematic to make the same assertion. It is 
always possible to argue that the general meeting of shareholders will 
eventually vote for a dividend to be declared as such if it is a procedural 
requirement in the memorandum of incorporation. This statement is largely 
based on the English matter of Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman 
Industries,4 where the Court of Appeal extended the rule laid down in Foss 
v Harbottle5 and shed some light on why the courts may be reluctant to give 
effect to a personal right within company law principles:  
An individual shareholder cannot bring an action in the courts to complain of 
an irregularity (undeclared dividend) in the conduct of the company's internal 
affairs if the irregularity is one which can be cured by a vote of the company 
in general meeting (would eventually declare a dividend).6  
However, to allow the general meeting the opportunity to declare a dividend, 
the board of directors should in the first instance have recommended a 
dividend for payment.7 Without such a recommendation, it will be very 
difficult to claim the existence of either a personal right or a debtor-creditor 
relationship. These difficulties are the direct result of the Foss matter, where 
the court described a company as an abstract entity existing largely in 
abstraction, with the board of directors on the one hand, and the general 
meeting of shareholders on the other.8 In many respects, this case still 
serves as the foundation for the current South African company law position 
on dividends.  
                                            
4  Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries No 2; CA 1982, as cited in Sealy 
Cases and Materials 503.  
5  Foss v Harbottle 1843 67 ER 189, as cited in Sealy Cases and Materials 478.  
6  Pretorius et al Hahlo's South African Company Law 389. 
7  See Cilliers et al Corporate Law 225, 355. 
8  Jaffey 1994 Denning LJ 91; Jaffey 1996 JLS 32. It is not clear whether the payment 
or non-payment of dividends is entirely a management or business decision – the 
board recommends and the general meeting of shareholders declares the dividend. 
If either the recommendation or declaration is lacking, no dividend right exists in the 
law. Also see Van Rooyen 1989 TSAR 593, who argues for void decisions taken by 
the general meeting of shareholders in the event of the abuse of the majority voting 
power. On the one hand, it is possible to argue for abuse only when the minority 
shareholders' rights are changed. A dividend, however, is not a right; thus, 
technically, it will be difficult to argue for a void majority decision on that basis. On 
the other hand, Van Rooyen indicates an objective test of whether the majority 
decision is in fact beneficial for the company, thereby tacitly indicating "fiduciary 
duties" for the general meeting of shareholders. Further consult Bainbridge 1998 Vill 
L Rev 741: "… a transaction must make at least one person better off and no one 
worse off". Vagts 1996 Harv L Rev 48; Blair and Stout 2001 Univ Pa L Rev 1810. 
Not to declare or recommend a dividend could be an example of opportunistic 
behaviour.  
CG KILIAN & E SNYMAN VAN DEVENTER  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  4 
In recent years, the so-called "merry-go-round" theory suggested by Esser 
and Du Plessis has gained some traction. Esser and Du Plessis have 
proposed that the company is represented by different interests, including 
the interests of shareholders, employees, the community and the 
environment, collectively forming the "merry-go-round".9 This implies that, 
as the company conducts its business (and the participants move up and 
down as the merry-go-round rotates), different interests will enjoy 
preference at different times.10 The art to be mastered by the courts is to 
know when preference should be given to shareholders' legitimate 
expectation of a dividend pay-out over the prerogative of the board of 
directors not to recommend a dividend, or of an annual general meeting of 
shareholders not to declare it.11 After all, if the company is profitable, and 
neither the board of directors recommended nor the general meeting of 
shareholders declared a dividend, an individual shareholder should be able 
to approach a court of law on the basis of the merry-go-round theory.12 To 
assist the South African courts in this balancing act, the study will therefore 
not only make the case for damages where dividends remain unpaid, but 
will also propose some practical solutions to the problem of calculating 
damages.  
The following discussion of two case law examples from the United 
Kingdom and Australia respectively supports the merry-go-round theory and 
reveals certain principles that the South African courts may find useful in 
striking a better balance between shareholder dividend "rights" and a 
company's discretionary power not to recommend or declare dividends. The 
first is the matter of Oxford Legal Group Limited v Sibbasbridge Services 
plc13 (hereinafter Oxford Legal Group), where the appeal court in the United 
Kingdom applied unique reasoning to imply a right when in fact no legal right 
exists. The principles identified in Oxford Legal Group will then be 
elaborated on in a discussion of the Australian matter of Sumiseki Materials 
Co Ltd v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd14 (hereinafter Sumiseki Materials). 
                                            
9  Esser and Du Plessis 2007 SAMLJ 346-360. 
10  See in general Havenga Fiduciary Duties 333.  
11  See in general Havenga Fiduciary Duties 326.  
12  See Kilian 2007 THRHR 391. 
13  Oxford Legal Group Limited v Sibbasbridge 2008 WL 1741230 (CA (Civ Div)). 
14  Sumiseki Materials Co Ltd v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd 2013 NSWSC 235 (25 Mar 2013). 
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2 The Oxford Legal Group case – the disputability of a 
board's discretionary power in the absence of a legal 
right 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Oxford Legal Group was an attempt 
to establish greater clarity on an important area in contemporary company 
law, namely the principles applicable to the existence (or non-existence) of 
a right to inspect the accounting records of a company. The facts of the 
matter were quite simple: Oxford Legal Group applied for a summary 
judgment against Sibbasbridge to entitle a director of Oxford to inspect 
Sibbasbridge's accounting records after the board of directors had 
exercised their discretionary power not to allow such an inspection. 
Although one may tend to think that an inspection of accounting records is 
rather different from receiving dividends, the significance of this case lies in 
its arguments on when and why a court should interfere in company 
resolutions.15  
The inspection of financial records was at that time regulated by section 222 
of the United Kingdom Companies Act 1985, which simply stated:  
A company's accounting records shall be kept at its registered office or such 
other place as the directors think fit, and shall at all times be open to inspection 
by the company officers. 
Therefore Sibbasbridge relied on section 222 to refuse an inspection on the 
basis that the above provision did not create a right to inspection.16 
Sibbasbridge further argued that such an inspection would be a breach of 
fiduciary duties, as the director who requested the inspection would share 
the information with other persons in the public sphere or in the commercial 
world, which could potentially cause damage to the company.17  
Importantly, even though the Court of Appeal eventually upheld the lower 
court's decision not to order the inspection of the financial records on a 
summary basis, the court reached this decision not because there was no 
such explicit or implied right but because the purposes for which the relevant 
director required the inspection were beyond enabling the director to carry 
out his functions in that capacity. Of more importance for this discussion is 
                                            
15  See Williamson 1983 J Leg Ed 210-216 and Marx et al Investment Management 5. 
The importance of alternatives constitutes the core logic of economic reasoning.  
16  Oxford Legal Group Limited v Sibbasbridge 2008 WL 1741230 (CA (Civ Div)) para 
16. 
17  Oxford Legal Group Limited v Sibbasbridge 2008 WL 1741230 (CA (Civ Div)) paras 
1-3, 16-17.  
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the court's reasoning on the board's discretionary power to refuse the 
director's request.  
2.1 The court's reasoning on the board' discretionary power to refuse 
a director's request to inspect the company's financial records 
In considering a remark by the lower court, which had stated that an 
inspection could cause the company irreparable harm, which would be a 
direct result of an assumed breach of directors' fiduciary duties in exercising 
business or management decisions,18 the Court of Appeal held that no court 
would act on the mere presumption that such an inspection constituted a 
breach of fiduciary duties.19 Instead, it had to be proved that the sole motive 
for the inspection was in fact to bring about a loss for Sibbasbridge in the 
form of the sharing of confidential information.  
However, the court asked, if an inspection did not amount to a so-called 
right, as Sibbasbridge contended, could a right perhaps be assumed based 
on the doctrine of proper purpose? If a director exercises his or her 
discretionary power not to allow a person to inspect the company's financial 
statements20 because the financial reports are regularly made available for 
review by any person, one may prima facie argue that the person requesting 
the inspection (whether a fellow director or shareholder) should in any event 
be aware of the financial position of the company.21 On the other hand, 
should the financial manager of the company continuously blunder without 
the knowledge of his superior or the financial director,22 it may firstly be said 
that the delegation of the directors' duties could be considered improper, 
even though it may have been made in good faith for the benefit of the 
company.23 Secondly, it would be improper in such circumstances to refuse 
                                            
18  Oxford Legal Group Limited v Sibbasbridge 2008 WL 1741230 (CA (Civ Div)) para 
17.  
19  Oxford Legal Group Limited v Sibbasbridge 2008 WL 1741230 (CA (Civ Div)) para 
29.  
20  See Hoffnagle and Butler 1972 Conn L Rev 707-733, who argue that shareholders 
should also have a "right" to inspect the financial matters of the company. This is 
possible only if the shareholder can establish a proper motive or purpose for such 
an inspection.  
21  Oxford Legal Group Limited v Sibbasbridge 2008 WL 1741230 (CA (Civ Div)) paras 
28-29.  
22  See Ex Parte Buttner Bros 1930 CPD 138, where the court interfered in directors' 
duties. Also see Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd 1974 AC 821; Redmond 
1991 UNSWLJ 100: "… trusting that official to perform such duties honestly".  
23  Oxford Legal Group Limited v Sibbasbridge 2008 WL 1741230 (CA (Civ Div)) para 
34.  
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any director access to the financial records of the company24 on the basis 
that a director has no explicit right in terms of the Companies Act to ask for 
an inspection or to view the financial statements, as this would deprive the 
director of the opportunity to ascertain the financial position of the company 
and/or to take the necessary action on behalf of the company to rectify the 
company's financial position.25  
This finding of the Court of Appeal in Oxford Legal Group indicates that the 
board of directors' discretionary power not to allow an inspection26 can in 
fact be challenged successfully even though the Companies Act does not 
create an explicit right to inspect the financial affairs/statements of the 
company.27 This gives rise to the question whether similar reasoning can be 
applied in order to challenge the board's discretionary power not to 
recommend or declare a dividend.28 
2.2 Applying the reasoning on discretionary power in Oxford Legal 
Group to the dividend question in South Africa 
A rather useful analogy may be drawn between the expectation to inspect 
the books of the company (dealt with in Oxford Legal Group) and the 
shareholder's expectation to receive a dividend. Neither has been clearly 
defined as explicit rights by way of statute. In respect of dividends, the South 
African Companies Act29 does not clearly provide for any shareholder's right 
to a dividend pay-out. However, although the "right" to company dividends 
is not explicitly catered for by legislation, the Oxford Legal Group reasoning 
presents some useful points that are equally relevant in making a case for 
such a right.  
                                            
24  Oxford Legal Group Limited v Sibbasbridge 2008 WL 1741230 (CA (Civ Div)) para 
33.  
25  Oxford Legal Group Limited v Sibbasbridge 2008 WL 1741230 (CA (Civ Div)) para 
35. 
26  Oxford Legal Group Limited v Sibbasbridge 2008 WL 1741230 (CA (Civ Div)) para 
37.  
27  Ex Parte Satbel (Edms) Bpk: In re Meyer v Satbel (Edms) Bpk 1984 4 SA 347 (W) 
351. "Lank voor hierdie stadium [vergadering] moes die belanghebbendes reeds al 
die tersaaklike inligting bekom het waarop hulle opinies en besluite rasioneel 
gebaseer kon word." [Long before this stage (the meeting), stakeholders should 
have already obtained the relevant information on which to rationally base their 
opinions and decisions.] 
28  See Wester 1990 Stetson L Rev 602. The proper purpose can be extended to decide 
on dividend payments.  
29  Companies Act 71 of 2008. See Renard Constructions v Minister for Public Works 
1992 26 NSWLR 234, where the court held that the use of power, even that permitted 
by a clause in a contract, may be deemed unfair and/or beyond the scope of the 
agreement. Also see Tomasic 1995 Canberra L Rev 158.  
CG KILIAN & E SNYMAN VAN DEVENTER  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  8 
A first option would be to argue that the discretionary power not to 
recommend a dividend could be for an improper purpose. Yet to convince a 
court of law that the board's discretionary power amounts to an improper 
purpose would not only be very difficult but would also be extremely 
technical. The argument for dividends will have to be based on accounting 
principles, and the financial affairs or statements of the company must 
indicate the availability of profits.30 Nevertheless, as an alternative to the 
proper purpose doctrine, a second option would be to rely on the company's 
memorandum of incorporation, or its constitution, as it is also known. As a 
contract between the company and its shareholders, the company 
constitution may regulate company dividends as a personal right, 
irrespective of whether or not the board has recommended a dividend. In 
addition, it can create a contractual right to which the board's discretionary 
power to recommend a dividend may be subordinate i.e. section 46(1) of 
Act 2008 regulates personal rights, court orders and discretionary powers 
relevant to dividends.31 The importance of a personal right that is contrary 
to the discretionary power to recommend a dividend is clearly illustrated in 
the Australian matter of Sumiseki Materials.  
3 The Sumiseki Materials case – the company constitution 
as a contract regulating a shareholder's "right" to 
dividends  
The Australian Corporations Act 2001 is similar to the South African 
Companies Act of 2008 in respect of a shareholder's right to dividends. In 
both jurisdictions, dividends are regulated by the law, and both jurisdictions 
accept dividends as a management decision. A court of law in both 
jurisdictions will not as a rule interfere in the payment of dividends.32 This 
established rule/principle was analysed and tested in the Sumiseki Materials 
matter, where the Supreme Court of New South Wales had to decide on the 
                                            
30  Oxford Legal Group Limited v Sibbasbridge 2008 WL 1741230 (CA (Civ Div)) para 
35. See Kilian and Du Plessis 2005 TSAR 55.  
31  Kilian 2007 THRHR 391. In this article a contractual naturalia right is implied by 
making use of naturalia relevant to the company's constitution, ie not in pursuit of 
self-interest, to challenge the board's discretionary power not to recommend a 
dividend. Also see Alevras and Du Plessis 2014 C&SLJ 312. 
32 See Kilian and Du Plessis 2005 TSAR 48; Alevras and Du Plessis 2014 C&SLJ 312; 
Du Plessis 2010 SALJ 304. Also see the Corporations Act, 2001 in s 140(1)(a) and 
s 254U regarding the contractual nature of the company's constitution and the 
discretionary power to pay dividends. Also see the Companies Act 2008 in s 15(6) 
and s 46 regarding the contractual nature of the company's constitution and 
discretionary power to pay dividends. It should be noted that the Companies Act 
2008 makes provision inter alia for dividends in terms of a legal obligation, and the 
latter was not previously part of the Companies Act 1973. 
CG KILIAN & E SNYMAN VAN DEVENTER  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  9 
legal difficulty arising from unpaid dividends.33 More specifically, the court 
was required to decide whether a shareholder had a right to a 
predetermined annual dividend. The Supreme Court cited approximately 40 
cases and considered 5 000 pages of documentary evidence pertaining to 
the exclusivity of the board of directors' discretion whether or not to 
recommend a predetermined dividend.34  
The business of the defendant in this matter (Wambo) was extracting coal 
from a mine about 16 km southwest of Singleton in the Hunter Valley region 
of New South Wales. The plaintiff (Sumiseki) was also in the business of 
extracting coal. From 1992 to 2001 Sumiseki invested $250 million in the 
Wambo mine by way of loans. However, as the Wambo mine was 
unprofitable, Sumiseki decided to sell its shares. Buy Out Group emerged 
as a potential buyer intending to purchase all the shares from Sumiseki. To 
effect the transaction, Buy Out Group used an investment vehicle (Hunter) 
to act on its behalf. On 10 January 2001 the sale to the investment vehicle 
of all Sumiseki's shares in the Wambo mine was completed.  
This shares transaction with Hunter required a new agreement to regulate 
the respective parties' individual rights and duties. In terms of the new 
agreement, Sumiseki obtained the contractual right to receive a dividend 
from Hunter, which had to be equal to Wambo's annual profit.35 If the 
dividends were unpaid, Sumiseki was entitled to interest of 10% per annum 
on the default payment. This contractual right was further complicated by a 
restructuring deal between Wambo and Sumiseki, which stated in brief that 
any existing debt between Hunter and Sumiseki had to be classified as class 
B shares with similar rights and duties in respect of dividends. Therefore 
Hunter owned all the ordinary shares and Sumiseki all the class B shares in 
Wambo.  
Wambo's constitution was later amended to provide for class A shares in 
art 2.1A and for class B shares in art 2.1B, which read as follows: 36 
Despite any provision in this constitution to the contrary, the holder of a B 
class share had the right to receive dividends determined by reference to 25% 
of a profit interest. 
                                            
33  Sumiseki Materials Co Ltd v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd 2013 NSWSC 235 (25 Mar 2013); 
Alevras and Du Plessis 2014 C&SLJ 312. 
34  Alevras and Du Plessis 2014 C&SLJ 315.  
35  Sumiseki Materials Co Ltd v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd 2013 NSWSC 235 (25 Mar 2013) 
6.  
36  Sumiseki Materials Co Ltd v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd 2013 NSWSC 235 (25 Mar 2013) 
28. 
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The profit interest referred to above was the profits made by the company 
at the end of the financial year, which were also available for dividend 
payments. In addition, however, Wambo's constitution stated that the profits 
would depend on the board's discretion (clause 9.1a), that the profits might 
be transferred to a reserve fund as the directors deemed fit (clause 9.4a), 
and that so much of the profits as the board deemed fit not to pay out as 
dividends or to capitalise may be carried over (clause 9.5).37 Clearly, 
art 2.1B would have been in conflict with the constitution were it not for the 
insertion of the words "[d]espite any provision in this constitution to the 
contrary", which ensured dividend payments.38 Therefore, at least from a 
legal perspective, it is quite clear that class B shares were entitled to a 
dividend, irrespective of any contrary clauses regulating the payment of 
dividends subject to the discretionary power of the board.39  
From 2007 Wambo suffered severe financial difficulties, and no dividends 
were paid from 2008. To justify the lack of dividend payments and to 
circumvent its contractual duty to pay dividends, Wambo's auditors argued 
that class B shares were in fact debt and not dividends in the true sense of 
the word: debt, they argued, was not part of company equity; a right to 
receive payment was a characteristic associated with loans or liabilities. 
Therefore, by implying that class B shares were actually debt, Wambo tried 
to prove that Sumiseki was not entitled to a fixed annual dividend. In 
addition, the auditors advised that any fixed dividend payments would 
contravene not only section 254T of the Corporations Act, but also 
Australian company law principles, which simply stated that dividends were 
not a right, but a discretionary payment.40  
The argument raised by Wambo's attorneys and supported by its auditors 
was that dividend payments had to be viewed objectively – in other words, 
in terms of the test of the reasonable person. Although this may appear 
simple, it is in fact very technical when applied to company law and 
accounting principles. For example, if the company constitution states that 
profits are available for dividend payments but the board decides not to pay 
any dividends, the company balance sheet will obviously disclose available 
dividends for future payment. To a reasonable person, the availability of 
                                            
37  Sumiseki Materials Co Ltd v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd 2013 NSWSC 235 (25 Mar 2013) 
29. 
38  Sumiseki Materials Co Ltd v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd 2013 NSWSC 235 (25 Mar 2013) 
57. 
39  Sumiseki Materials Co Ltd v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd 2013 NSWSC 235 (25 Mar 2013) 
11.  
40  Sumiseki Materials Co Ltd v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd 2013 NSWSC 235 (25 Mar 2013) 
14.  
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profits for dividend distribution is certain; all that is uncertain is the actual 
payment.41 The reasonable person does not conclude that no dividends will 
be paid in future. This uncertainty as to the actual payment of dividends can, 
however, lead to the depressing possibility that the company might "bank" 
the available dividends for up to ten consecutive years, making the 
dividends available only in year 11 or whenever the board decides to pay 
them.  
To circumvent this difficulty, the court interpreted the company constitution 
in the same manner that any court of law would interpret a contract between 
parties.42 The court held that the true objective of the parties was to 
participate in company profits on an annual basis. Besides this 
interpretation, the court also applied section 232 of the Corporations Act, 
which reads as follows:43  
The Court may make an order … if … (a) the conduct of a company's affairs 
… (e) is oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, 
a member or members whether in that capacity or in any other capacity.  
Determining the correct meaning of "oppressive" or "unfairly" required the 
application of the commercial bystander test, which is relevant to oppressive 
and unfairly prejudicial company conduct.44 Even though the defendant's 
attorneys also relied on the debt-to-service ratio to avoid paying dividends, 
using a technical argument as to why this ratio was fair from an economic 
point of view, the court ruled that Sumiseki's right and expectation to receive 
annual dividend payments had to be upheld and that company law 
principles in this regard were subordinate to the principles of the law of 
contract.45  
4 Awarding damages to a shareholder 
4.1 The case for awarding damages where dividends remain unpaid 
Although companies are artificial persons, with the board of directors as one 
organ of the company and the general meeting of shareholders as another, 
                                            
41  Sumiseki Materials Co Ltd v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd 2013 NSWSC 235 (25 Mar 2013) 
135. 
42  Alevras and Du Plessis 2014 C&SLJ 320. 
43  Sumiseki Materials Co Ltd v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd 2013 NSWSC 235 (25 Mar 2013) 
215. 
44  Sumiseki Materials Co Ltd v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd 2013 NSWSC 235 (25 Mar 2013) 
225. 
45  Sumiseki Materials Co Ltd v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd 2013 NSWSC 235 (25 Mar 2013) 
60-67. 
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technical interpretations of what constitutes a company and how dividends 
ought to be viewed should be avoided when such interpretations are 
intended to circumvent the shareholders' expectation to participate in 
company profits or, in other words, are designed to cause injury to the 
shareholders.46 This is supported by both Oxford Legal Group and Sumiseki 
Materials.47  
Sumiseki Materials also contains certain principles evident in the law of 
partnerships in South Africa. It is an implied term in the law of partnerships, 
for example, that all partners have a legitimate expectation to share in the 
partnership profits in good faith.48 If profits are made and one of the partners 
is to be excluded from participating in those profits,49 the cooperation 
between the parties is obviously in bad faith, and therefore the partnership 
cannot technically exist in law.50 Interestingly, profits give rise to a 
contractual right, and should a partner not be participating in the profits,51 
his or her right to profit-sharing is protected by means of a partnership 
contract, which may for example entitle such a partner to a claim for the 
damages suffered.52 The same reasoning could be relevant to company 
law, provided that a few obstacles are addressed.53 
The courts have never before identified a company constitution as a specific 
kind of contract (i.e. a forward contract), which may be part of the reason 
why they have been reluctant to award damages to a shareholder whenever 
a company failed to pay a dividend, as shareholders always have the option 
of selling their non-performing shares to the public.54 However, even if their 
                                            
46  See Esser and Du Plessis 2007 SAMLJ 358, who discuss the critical issues 
regarding shareholder expectations. Also see Ex Parte Natal Coal Exploration Co 
Ltd 1985 4 SA 279 (W) 282, where a shareholder's prospect of dividends is defined.  
47  Also see Rider 1979 CLJ 148; Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 
537, where the court stated clearly that a company is in essence a partnership, of 
which the shareholders constitute the partners. Because a partnership is a contract 
between partners, individual partners' rights and duties flow from the contract itself 
or from implied terms.  
48  Own emphasis. See Snyman Remedies ter Beskikking 18; Kilian 2007 THRHR 391. 
49  See Correia et al Financial Management 299; Black, Wright and Davies In Search 
of Shareholder Value 40. 
50  See Snyman Hervormende Suid-Afrikaanse Vennootskapswet 17, where the author 
discusses the importance of having legislation to regulate the difficulties associated 
with partnership law more clearly, ie the internal relationship of partners as well as 
the remedies. Also see Henning 1980 Mod Bus L 143, which explains the partners' 
participation in profits or losses in a leonine partnership.  
51  See Pretorius et al Hahlo's South African Company Law 55, 174, 270. 
52  See Visser et al South African Mercantile and Company Law 245-266.  
53  See Vasco Dry Cleaners v Twycross 1979 1 SA 603 (A) 610; Magwaza v Heenan 
1979 2 SA 1019 (A) 1024; Bainbridge 1998 Vill L Rev 772.  
54  Kilian 2007 THRHR 391 indicates that the constitution is a forward contract. Also 
see Millon 1990 Duke LJ 230. As an example of why the courts are reluctant to award 
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reluctance can be justified as a method of creating legal certainty in the 
commercial world, the law can still be developed to award damages in 
appropriate circumstances.55 The following section provides a few 
suggestions as to how this may be done in practice. 
Although the payment of dividends and the amount of the dividends to be 
paid in the future will always be uncertain, being characteristic of a forward 
contract,56 current facts and circumstances – such as the provisions in the 
company constitution, the growth rate of the company as well as the book 
value per share – prove useful in exploring the following simple ways to 
calculate damages.57 In assessing the proposed methods set out below, it 
should also be noted that the actual amount of the damages payable is not 
as important for this study58 as the process of considering and identifying 
different ways of arriving at a fair amount.59  
4.2 Potential ways of calculating damages 
Contractual damages and ROI: If the company constitution clearly stipulates 
that shareholders are entitled to dividends equal to 25% of company profits, 
such an amount is easy to estimate for the purposes of calculating 
damages. However, if the constitution is silent on the specific percentage of 
dividends, the following alternative may be considered: By identifying the 
discretionary historic dividends, the shareholder could calculate the ROI, as 
suggested by Kilian and Du Plessis.60 For instance, if an initial investment 
(R5 000) in exchange for shares produces dividend returns of R1 500 in 
year one, R3 500 in year two and R1 400 in the final year for unlisted 
                                            
damages see Stewart v Sashalite Ltd [1936] 2 All ER 1481, ie the probability that the 
company will pay dividends  
55  See Golecki 2008 MUJLT 212: "… if some parts of the law are not promoting 
efficiency, such rules should be changed to reflect the [economic] efficiency attitude 
of the whole legal system". Also see Jehring 1963 U Det LJ 500. In South America, 
profit-sharing is mandatory in company law.  
56  See Kilian 2007 THRHR 391. Also refer to Newberry 1995 ABAJ 60, where it is stated that 
uncertain future events must be subject to risk disclosures. 
57  See in general Novick v Comair Holdings Ltd 1979 2 SA 116 (W); Pietermaritzburg 
Corporation v South African Breweries Ltd 1911 AD 501, 515, 516, 524. 
58  See Kilian 2007 THRHR 391, where the author focuses on two formulas, both of 
which have a different end result in mind. The question posed is: When should one 
formula be subject to another? There is no clear answer. Also see Ex Parte Strydom: 
In Re Central Plumbing Works (Natal) (Pty) Ltd; Ex Parte Spendiff: In Re Candida 
Footwear Manufacturers (Ltd) Pty; Ex Parte Spendiff: In Re Jerseytex (Pty) Ltd 1988 
1 SA 616 (D) 623E. 
59  See Copp 2001 JCLS 12-19, who argues that achieving fairness is something of an 
art in company law – a concept of balancing rights.  
60  Kilian and Du Plessis 2005 TSAR 48.  
CG KILIAN & E SNYMAN VAN DEVENTER  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  14 
shares,61 the total cash inflow equals R6 400. The average cash inflow is 
thus calculated at R2 133 per year, or 42,6% (R2 133 ÷ R5 000), which will 
be the percentage damages claimable when the company fails to declare 
any dividends for the following year.62 An alternative would be to calculate 
the damages based on a discount factor/value. Such a calculation reduces 
the previous years of dividend payments to the initial investment of R5 000 
in order to indicate the percentage of the dividends payable on such an 
initial investment.63 
Damages and return on equity (ROE): According to this suggested method, 
the growth rate for a particular company is calculated by multiplying its 
retained turnover by the ROE ratio. If a company is able to retain 75% of its 
turnover, and the ROE is 15%, the expected growth rate for dividends would 
be 11,25% (15 x 0,75), which would represent the growth or increase in the 
previous dividend payment.64  
Damages and history of no dividends declared: Where a company has a 
history of not declaring dividends, the solution is simply to compare the book 
value per share with that of previous financial years. If, for example, the 
company retains 100% of its earnings (or profits) because no dividends 
were declared, the book value or return on equity could be calculated as 
follows:  
 1999 2000 
Net profit retained R0 R15 
Number of shares 100 100 
Increase on book value 
per share  
R100 R115 (15% increase) 
Book value per share 
calculated 
R1 (100 ÷ 
100) 
R1,15 (115 ÷ 100) (15% 
increase) 
 
                                            
61  See Ex Parte Natal Coal Exploration Co Ltd 1985 4 SA 279 (W) 282, where it is 
stated that "[t]he prospect of a future stream of dividends may serve to enhance the 
capital value of … shares". 
62  See Delport Verkryging van Kapitaal 190.  
63  See Delport Verkryging van Kapitaal 191; Kilian 2007 THRHR 391.  
64  See Smart, Megginson and Gitman Corporate Finance 155. Also see Orts 1998 Yale 
L & Pol'y Rev 266, 307, 308.  
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As no dividends were paid to the shareholders, company equity has 
increased by 15%. Of course, instead of paying dividends the company 
could buy back its shares at a 15% higher value. The shares would be 
repurchased at their book value per share, and the 15% increase on the 
book value would be added value or, in other words, profits that could be 
used to pay dividends.65  
4.3 When courts are faced with various methods to calculate 
damages 
One could argue that shareholders always have the option of selling their 
shares for a profit instead of waiting to receive a dividend.66 However, even 
though this may be an alternative way to receive cash in the commercial 
world, what if the shareholder is not willing to sell?  
In line with section 158(a) of the Companies Act of 2008, which deals with 
the development of the law, considering or identifying alternatives is 
important, as these enable better judgment when, for example, courts have 
to decide67 on the remedies available to shareholders to challenge the 
company's discretion not to recommend dividends, or on how to calculate 
dividends as damages.68 The difficulty in applying these various alternatives 
in practice simply is that courts may be confused as to how the correct 
formula for calculating dividends should be identified or applied.69 In this 
regard, Arnold provides the following clarification:  
[G]oing through a rigorous process of valuation [dividend] is more important 
than arriving at an answer. It is the understanding of the assumptions [of 
alternatives] and an appreciation of the nature of the inputs to the process that 
give insight, not a single number at the end.70 
It appears that Stegmann J in Ex Parte Lebowa Development Corporation 
Ltd71 had in mind a similar explanation when he was confronted with 
                                            
65  See Smart, Megginson and Gitman Corporate Finance 156. Also see Ex Parte Natal 
Coal Exploration Co Ltd 1985 4 SA 279 (W) 282: "A shareholder is a participant in a 
risk venture embarked on with a view to making profits. He has the prospect that if 
profits are made, a dividend may be paid."  
66  Pretorius et al Hahlo's South African Company Law 144, 146.  
67  See Smart, Megginson and Gitman Corporate Finance 381, where the authors focus 
on the definitions of "rational" efficiency.  
68  The heading of s 158 is in fact "Remedies to promote purpose of the Act".  
69  See Kilian 2007 THRHR 391. 
70  Arnold Handbook of Corporate Finance 345.  
71  Ex Parte Lebowa Development Corporation Ltd 1989 3 SA 71 (TPD) 97G-I, which 
followed on the dictum in Ex Parte Strydom: In Re Central Plumbing Works (Natal) 
(Pty) Ltd; Ex Parte Spendiff: In Re Candida Footwear Manufacturers (Ltd) Pty; Ex 
Parte Spendiff: In Re Jerseytex (Pty) Ltd 1988 1 SA 616 (D) 623E.  
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different formulas to calculate the true solvency position of a company. He 
held that "the suggestion that one test [solvency test]72 is true and the other 
not, is unwarranted".73 A court should therefore analyse all available 
information to make an informed or rational judgment concerning a suitable 
method of awarding damages. It should be noted that a court would not 
grant specific performance where a plaintiff could be equally or adequately 
compensated by damages. However, it should also be noted that in the 
event of the non-delivery of purchased shares a court should grant specific 
performance instead of damages. The reason is simply that a favourable 
economic reality may be achieved by ordering damages instead of an order 
for specific performance. For example, if a shareholder purchased 171 000 
shares and received delivery of only 107 000 shares, the company who 
failed to deliver 64 000 shares would increase its earnings per share ratio, 
as these shares would not be taken into account when calculating earnings 
per share.74  
5 A final consideration: The disputability of the decision by 
the general meeting of shareholders 
It may happen that the board of directors recommends or authorises a 
dividend, but the general meeting of shareholders decides not to declare 
the dividend.75 It is somewhat problematic to establish when such a decision 
taken by the general meeting of shareholders is invalid in South Africa.76 
Van Rooyen argues that the decision can be challenged by the minority 
                                            
72  Own insertion. 
73  Ex Parte Lebowa Development Corporation Ltd 1989 3 SA 71 (TPD) 97G-I. Also see 
Ex Parte Buttner Bros 1930 CPD 138.  
74  Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 1 SA 776 (A). See Kilian and 
Snyman-Van Deventer 2014 PER 2636. 
75  See Cassim Practitioner's Guide 116.  
76  See Van Rooyen 1989 TSAR 603, who argues for an objective test to decide whether 
the decision taken by the general meeting of shareholders is valid or void. Also see 
Hoffnagle and Butler 1972 Conn L Rev 707; Pretorius et al Hahlo's South African 
Company Law 207. 
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shareholders of the company,77 and that the test to challenge it should take 
the form of an objective enquiry.78  
This approach is sui generis, as the doctrine of proper purpose relates only 
to company directors' duties and not to shareholders' duties as such. To 
support Van Rooyen's argument, section 163(1) allows for minority 
shareholders to challenge the general meeting's decision not to declare any 
dividends.79  
Nevertheless, the following example illustrates when such a decision by the 
general meeting of shareholders will be sound and valid, and thus difficult 
to challenge objectively:  
Extract from the income statement  
 2003 2002 
Top line 14 669 23 822 
Net profit -575 1 317 
 
Extract from the cash flow statement 
 Beginning End 
2003 16 607 9 401 
                                            
77  Van Rooyen 1989 TSAR 605: "Lede mag in beginsel stem soos hulle wil en hul eie 
belange in ag neem by die uitbring van hulle stemme, maar daar moet rekening 
gehou word met die feit dat die eindresultaat van 'n stemming ... tersyde gestel kan 
word indien dit nie ... in belang van die maatskappy aangemerk kan word nie." 
[Members may in principle vote as they wish and consider their own interests in 
casting their votes, but it must be kept in mind that the end result of a vote may be 
set aside if it cannot be said to be in the interest of the company.]. Also see Koh 
2005 JCLS 363; Vliet 1949 Okla L Rev 1-37. "One of the major dangers involved is 
that of minority control in the sense that the directors seldom own more than a small 
fraction, if any, of the voting shares in their individual capacities and therefore, being 
unrestrained by the responsibilities of beneficial ownership, may act other than in the 
best interest of those whom they represent."  
78  Van Rooyen 1989 TSAR 605, arguing for a "reasonable person" test. 
79  Section 163 deals with relief from oppressive or prejudicial company conduct.  
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Extract from the balance sheet 
 2003 2002 
Total assets 315 703 273 784 
 
An analysis of the above leads to the following conclusions: Although the 
total assets of the company increased from 2002 to 2003, the same cannot 
be said for the net profit or cash in hand. Therefore, the positive end result 
in total assets creates an illusion that the company is profitable. The net 
profit of the company, however, decreased in 2003, which may indicate that 
either the cost of the capital employed by the company was very high80 or 
the assets of the company could not produce a sufficient turnover to exceed 
the previous year's turnover.81 To pay dividends under such circumstances 
would clearly be detrimental to the company, in which case the shareholders 
may rescind dividend payments.82 Although section 163(2)(j) is a statutory 
remedy for relief against the oppressive conduct of companies, it is clear 
from the example above that the company is unprofitable and should not 
compensate shareholders for any undeclared dividends. The decision of the 
general meeting of shareholders to refuse to declare dividends may be an 
indication of oppressive conduct in terms of section 163(1), and relief should 
be granted only if the financial position of the company is favourable. On the 
other hand, section 163(2)(h) allows the court to change/vary the 
constitution to rectify any oppressive conduct. In the Sumiseki Materials 
case the shareholder successfully argued relief against the oppressive 
conduct of the company, and as a result the court varied the constitution to 
give effect to compensation for the unpaid dividends.83  
6 Conclusion 
                                            
80  See Varallo and Finkelstein 1992 Bus Law 239, who argue that perhaps no area has 
received less attention than the law pertaining to the governance of a troubled 
company. Also refer to Tomasic 1995 Canberra L Rev158.  
81  See Pretorius et al Hahlo's South African Company Law 144-146, who explain the 
meaning of "profit".  
82  See Rider 1979 CLJ 148, 150 for an explanation of the managerial functions of the 
general meeting of shareholders in general. Also see Tomasic 1995 Canberra L Rev 
158.  
83  Alevras and Du Plessis 2014 C&SLJ 312. 
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Orthodox company law principles dictate that dividends are based on the 
board's discretion, which means that a claim for damages where dividends 
remain unpaid may seem inconceivable. However, this article has indicated 
that South African courts may draw some valuable lessons from the 
reasoning applied in Oxford Legal Group and Sumiseki Materials to develop 
South African company law to cater for circumstances where a company 
board's discretion could be validly rejected to claim damages in the event of 
an unpaid dividend, even where a shareholder's right to a dividend is not 
explicitly regulated.84 Having made the case for damages, this study has 
also proposed certain practical alternatives for calculating the amount of 
such damages, knowing that to recognise and identify alternatives can only 
assist in arriving at a more suitable solution than the current South African 
position of not granting damages at all.85  
Facilitating this development of the common law will not only be in keeping 
with the spirit of section 158(a) of the 2008 Companies Act, but will also be 
fairer towards those getting onto the "merry-go-round", by balancing 
contractual rights with discretionary power so as to give business efficacy 
to dividends.86  
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